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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(3) and (b)(4) (1988), 
the bankruptcy court awarded W. James Scott ("Scott"), a creditor 
and former officer and director of the debtor, Mechem Financial, 
Inc. ("Mechem"), reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection 
with activities that the court felt "substantial[ly] contributed" 
to Mechem's estate.  Most of Scott's efforts were aimed at 
exposing the fact that Mechem's officers and directors were 
engaged in fraudulent activity.  The bankruptcy court's award was 
appealed by three other creditors of the estate, Michael Q. 
Lebron, Michael C. Lebron, and Anthony Lebron ("the Lebrons"). 
The district court reversed, holding that some of Scott's 
expenses were incurred either before the chapter 11 petition was 
filed or after the case was converted to chapter 7, and that 
§§503(b)(3) and (b)(4) do not authorize recovery of expenses 
incurred during these periods.  The district court further held 
that Scott could not recover the expenses he incurred while the 
chapter 11 proceedings were pending because he was acting solely 
for his own benefit, thus making any benefit to the estate purely 
incidental.  Finally, the court held that the bankruptcy court's 
award was inequitable because Scott was an insider in the 
corporation that was committing the fraud.  Scott appeals the 




 Mechem was founded in 1986 to manage pre-need funeral 
trust funds for individuals and to provide these individuals with 
funeral goods and services to be paid for with the funds in 
trust.  The funds were advanced from the participating 
individuals to Mechem through funeral directors.  Scott was one 
of the three initial members of Mechem's board of directors as 
well as a minority shareholder.  In addition, Scott was a funeral 
director who had entrusted Mechem with funds under pre-need 
contracts executed by his customers.  A second board member, John 
R. Copple ("Copple"), served as the President of Mechem, and 
controlled the day-to-day operations of the corporation.  Soon 
after Mechem was organized, Scott began to sense that Copple was 
not disclosing to him information regarding Mechem financial 
matters and investments.  Then, in October 1987, Copple and the 
third member of the board of directors removed Scott as an 
officer and director of Mechem.    
 After his removal, Scott apparently made several 
requests of Copple for financial information about Mechem, but 
Copple refused these requests.  Therefore, in 1988, Scott filed a 
complaint in mandamus against Mechem in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Erie County, Pennsylvania, seeking to exercise his rights 
under Pennsylvania law as a shareholder to examine Mechem's 
books.  During the discovery phase of this action, Scott became 
aware that Copple had misappropriated millions of dollars of pre-
need funeral trust fund monies for personal use, much of which 
was used to purchase rare coins controlled by Copple.  In light 
of this information, Scott, in February 1990, filed a complaint 
in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, 
Pennsylvania, against Mechem, its officers, directors, and 
majority shareholders, and certain holders of trust funds.  He 
sought appointment of a custodian to prevent further 
mismanagement and fraud, a complete and accurate accounting of 
the assets held by Mechem, an injunction against the disbursement 
or transfer of pre-need trust funds, and a declaration that 
certain issues and transfers of corporate stock were void.  Scott 
accompanied this complaint with an affidavit that detailed 
alleged acts of mismanagement and self-dealing by Copple in his 
capacity as president of Mechem.   
 According to the bankruptcy court, the walls began to 
close in on Copple at this point.  On March 6, 1990, a common 
pleas court ordered Mechem and, specifically, Copple, to file 
before March 12, 1990, inventories of all assets, investments, 
and accounts held by Mechem or Copple personally.  Because 
neither Mechem nor Copple filed a satisfactory inventory, Scott 
promptly moved to compel compliance with the court's order.  On 
March 19, 1990, the common pleas court entered an additional 
order directing Mechem and Copple to file by March 26, 1990, 
inventories and more detailed supporting information. 
 Copple reacted to the court's order by causing Mechem 
to file a chapter 11 petition on March 23, 1990.  Scott 
immediately filed in the bankruptcy court for the appointment of 
a trustee, for an expedited accounting, and for partial relief 
from a stay.  The bankruptcy court granted Scott's motion on 
March 28, 1990, and a trustee was appointed on that same day. 
Scott then gave the trustee all of the information that he had 
gathered during his pre-bankruptcy petition legal actions against 
Mechem and Copple.  The bankruptcy court found that this 
information "contributed to the [t]rustee's report of 
investigation filed promptly with [the] Court on April 24, 1990 
identifying various assets and summarizing the history of 
questionable financial transactions between [Mechem] and [Copple 
and affiliates and corporations under Copple's control.]"  B.Op. 
at 6.   
 The trustee recommended that the proceedings be 
converted to chapter 7, which the bankruptcy court did on May 23, 
1990.  During the liquidation process, the trustee collected cash 
in the amount of $460,000.  The trustee also brought numerous 
adversary proceedings against Copple and his wife, which resulted 
in the turnover of additional property to the estate.  Finally, 
the trustee obtained a judgment against Copple for $4,009,645, 
and against Copple and his wife for $1,307,567.  According to the 
trustee, unless the Copples successfully appeal these awards, 
another $400,000 to $700,000 will be collected upon the 
liquidation of their personal assets.  Despite the collection and 
liquidation efforts, the unsecured creditors of Mechem will incur 
losses.   
 Scott, pursuant to §§ 503(b)(3) and (b)(4), applied to 
the bankruptcy court for reimbursement of the expenses he had 
incurred in connection with the Mechem legal actions and his 
participation in the chapter 11 and chapter 7 proceedings. 
Specifically, Scott requested $48,805.12 as reimbursement for 
attorney fees and $10,207.88 as reimbursement for general 
expenses.  These amounts represented expenses incurred before, 
during, and after Mechem entered the chapter 11 proceedings.  The 
bankruptcy court awarded Scott his requested reimbursements in 
full.  In justification of this award, the court made the 
following findings: 
 The information gathered by Scott in his 
prosecution of matters against the Debtor was 
critical to the Court in making an immediate 
determination to appoint a Trustee and 
critical to the Trustee in making a prompt 
investigation and report to the Court which 
resulted in conversion of this case to 
Chapter 7.  Scott's information also assisted 
the Trustee in the subsequent collection of 
assets for the benefit of creditors of the 
estate. 
 
 Scott's efforts were more than just a 
passing benefit to the estate.  The efforts 
of Scott were a substantial contribution in 
assisting the Trustee to carry out his 
responsibilities.  Scott's efforts far 
exceeded those which he was obligated to 
perform. . . .   
 
 . . . [T]he benefit Scott bestowed upon 
this estate is clear -- absent Scott's 
pursuit of this Debtor, the Debtor lead by 
Copple might still be fleecing individuals 
into investing in the Debtor's preneed 
trusts.  Copple could still be diverting the 
Debtor's assets to his own uses.  There might 
be no estate for unsecured creditors. 
 
 . . . Most, if not all of the individual 
preneed trust purchasers, will receive the 
funeral that they anticipated and the 
unsecured creditors will receive some 
dividend from this estate.  Without Scott's 
efforts, the result could have been much 
worse -- the Debtor could have continued to 
operate until all of the assets were 
dissipated. 
 
 We find that all of Scott's efforts for 
which he incurred fees and expenses both 
prepetition and postpetition resulted in a 
direct benefit and were a substantial 
contribution to the estate.  Any fees and 
expenses which Scott incurred prepetition 
substantially contributed to the 
administration of the Debtor's estate 
postpetition.  Thus, there is more than 
sufficient reason to reimburse Scott for fees 
and expenses in their entirety.   
B.Op. 9-10.   
 The bankruptcy court also specifically found that 
Scott's efforts after the case was converted to one under chapter 
7 were of significant benefit to the creditors:   
Most of the individual purchasers of preneed 
funeral trusts will be spared from any 
significant losses, however, because of the 
efforts of the [t]rustee to provide a 
mechanism for funeral directors to provide 
those individuals with fully funded 
replacement trusts with which most funeral 
directors are complying. . . . Scott assisted 
the [t]rustee in this effort.  Scott has 
provided funerals for its preneed clients who 
have died and replacement trusts for its 
living individual clients in the amount of 
$64,548.51 and Scott, as a creditor, has an 
unsecured claim as a creditor of this estate 
for those expenditures.   
B.Op. 7.   
 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's 
decision to award Scott administrative expenses.  First, the 
court found that under §§ 503(b)(3) and (b)(4), unless the 
bankruptcy petition is filed involuntarily or there is a pre-
petition custodian or receiver, pre-petition fees and expenses 
cannot be recovered.  Because these proceedings were voluntary 
and there was no pre-petition custodian or receiver, Scott could 
not recover any expenses that he incurred prior to the date 
Mechem filed its chapter 11 petition.  The court also found that 
because §§ 503(b)(3) and (b)(4) specifically authorize the 
recovery of expenses for contributions made in cases "under 
chapter 9 or 11," any expenses incurred after a case is converted 
from chapter 9 or 11 may not be recovered pursuant to these 
sections.  Thus, it held that Scott was not entitled to recoup 
the expenses he incurred after the case was converted to chapter 
7.  Turning to expenses incurred during the pendency of a chapter 
9 or 11 case, the court further concluded that an applicant may 
recover such expenses pursuant to §§ 503(b)(3) and (b)(4) only if 
they were incurred as a result of activities which made a 
"substantial contribution" to the case, and which were not 
engaged in primarily for the applicant's own benefit.  The court 
held that because Scott's actions "were mainly done to protect 
his own interests, and any benefits conferred upon the estate 
were incidental[,]" there was no basis for awarding him any 
expenses.  In addition, the court commented that it would be 
unjust for Scott, an original incorporator, director, 
shareholder, and insider of the debtor, to be reimbursed in full 
from funds that would otherwise benefit hundreds of duped 
purchasers.  In this regard, the court found that the replacement 
trusts which Scott helped establish did "not make the purchasers 
whole."  Op. 5.  
                     
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
decision, as well as over the legal determinations of the 
bankruptcy court.  However, we review the bankruptcy court's 
factual findings for clear error.  See Sapos v. Provident Inst. 
of Sav. in Town of Boston, 967 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("Because in bankruptcy cases the district court sits as an 
appellate court, our review of the district court's decision is 
plenary.  This court exercises the same review over the district 
court's decision that the district court may exercise.  The 
findings of fact by the bankruptcy court are reviewable only for 
clear error.  Legal questions are, of course, subject to plenary 
review".) (quoting Brown v. Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 851 
F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)). 
 
III. 
 Subsections 503(b)(3) and (b)(4) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the only authority relied upon by Scott in support of his 
award, authorize the court to award administrative expenses under 
several different sets of circumstances.  They provide:   
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall 
be allowed, administrative expenses, other 
than claims allowed under section 502(f) of 
this title, including-- 
 
* * *  
 
 (3) the actual, necessary expenses, 
other than compensation and reimbursement 
specified in paragraph (4) of this 
subsection, incurred by--  
 
 (A) a creditor that files a 
petition under section 303 of this 
title; 
 
 (B) a creditor that recovers, 
after the court's approval, for the 
benefit of the estate any property 
transferred or concealed by the debtor; 
 
 (C) a creditor in connection 
with the prosecution of a criminal 
offense relating to the case or to the 
business or property of the debtor; 
 
 (D) a creditor, an indenture 
trustee, an equity security holder, or a 
committee representing creditors or 
equity security holders other than a 
committee appointed under section 1102 
of this title, in making a substantial 
contribution in a case under chapter 9 
or 11 of this title; or 
 
 (E) a custodian superseded 
under section 543 of this title, and 
compensation for the services of such 
custodian; 
 
 (4) reasonable compensation for 
professional services rendered by an attorney 
or an accountant of an entity whose expense 
is allowable under paragraph (3) of this 
subsection, based on the time, the nature, 
the extent, and the value of such services, 
and the cost of comparable services other 
than in a case under this title, and 
reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses 
incurred by such attorney or  
accountant . . .. 
§ 503.  Because § 503(b)(4) authorizes awards of legal and 
accounting fees only in situations coming within the scope of  
§ 503(b)(3), and because subsection (D) is the only portion of  
§ 503(b)(3) arguably applicable here,1 we focus on  
§ 503(b)(3)(D). 
 Under § 503(b)(3)(D), four categories of persons may 
apply for reimbursement of expenses:  (1) creditors, (2) 
indenture trustees, (3) equity security holders, and (4) creditor 
and equity holder committees other than official committees 
appointed under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The court may 
award an applicant actual, necessary expenses which were incurred 
"in making a substantial contribution in a case under chapter 9 
or 11."  Under subsection (b)(4), this may include reimbursement 
for professional fees of an attorney or accountant, where those 
                                                           
1Scott cannot recover his claimed expenses pursuant to 
§503(b)(3)(A) because this subsection refers to creditors that 
file an involuntary petition under § 303, which Scott did not do 
here.  Subsection (b)(3)(B) is also inapplicable because it 
requires that the creditor seek prior approval from the court for 
his or her actions, which Scott did not seek.  Nor may Scott 
recover expenses pursuant to subsection (B)(3)(C), because this 
section pertains to expenses incurred in connection with the 
prosecution of a criminal offense, and none of the bills 
submitted by Scott reflect charges for services rendered in the 
course of criminal proceedings against Copple.  See D.Ct. Op. 14. 
Finally, subsection (b)(3)(E) is inapplicable here because it 
refers to expenses incurred by a superseded custodian, and there 
was no superseded custodian in this case. 
fees meet the additional requirements of that subsection.  Any 
expenses reimbursed are administrative expenses with the 
attendant priority.  11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). 
 Here, Scott is a creditor as well as an equity security 
holder, and the administrative expenses that he seeks consist of 
attorney fees and general expenses.  Therefore, he is entitled to 
these expenses if he incurred them as a result of activities 
which (1) made a "substantial contribution," (2) "in a case under 
chapter 9 or 11." 
 The "substantial contribution" standard of  
§ 503(b)(3)(D) is derived from §§ 242 and 243 of the former 
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 642, 643 (repealed 1978).  Sen. Rep. 
No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852.  Those sections were, in turn, derived 
from former Section 77B(c)(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.  
§ 207(c)(9) (repealed 1938).  See, 6A James William Moore & 
Robert Stephen Oglebay, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 13.01, at 521-23 
(James William Moore ed., 14th ed. 1977); Alfred B. Teton, 
Reorganization Revised, 48 Yale L.J. 573, 603-607 (1939). 
Sections 242 and 243 and § 503(b)(3)(D) liberalized the 
circumstances under which reimbursement was authorized, but at 
each stage in the progression, the core concept has been the 
same.  See, Collier, supra, ¶ 13.01, at 523 (14th ed.); 3 Hon. 
Roy Babitt, et al., Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 503.04, at 14 & 44-50 
(Lawrence P. King ed. 15th ed. 1994); Teton, supra, at 604.  The 
services engaged by creditors, creditor committees and other 
parties interested in a reorganization are presumed to be 
incurred for the benefit of the engaging party and are 
reimbursable if, but only if, the services "directly and 
materially contributed" to the reorganization.  Steere v. Baldwin 
Locomotive Works, 98 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1938) (applying 
Section 77B(c)); In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 206 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 
1953) (same); In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of Am., Inc., 157 F.2d 
640 (6th Cir. 1946) (applying § 243); In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55 
(10th Cir. 1988) (applying § 503(b)(3)(D)).     
 Thus, "[i]n determining whether there has been a 
'substantial contribution' pursuant to section 503(b)(3)(D), the 
applicable test is whether the efforts of the applicant resulted 
in an actual and demonstrable benefit to the debtor's estate and 
the creditors."  In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988). 
See also, Matter of Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 
(5th Cir. 1986); Collier, supra, ¶ 503.04, at 38 (15th ed.). 
"[S]ervices which substantially contribute to a case are those 
which foster and enhance . . . the progress of reorganization." 
Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253 (quoting In re Richton 
Int'l Corp., 15 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (other 
citation omitted)).   
 Subsection 503(b)(3)(D) represents an accommodation 
between the twin objectives of encouraging "meaningful creditor 
participation in the reorganization process," Richton, 15 B.R. at 
855-56 (citation omitted), and "keeping fees and administrative 
expenses at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the estate as 
possible for the creditors."  Otte v. U.S., 419 U.S. 43, 53 
(1974) (citation omitted).  Inherent in the term "substantial" is 
the concept that the benefit received by the estate must be more 
than an incidental one arising from activities the applicant has 
pursued in protecting his or her own interests.  Creditors are 
presumed to be acting in their own interests until they satisfy 
the court that their efforts have transcended self-protection. In 
re Solar Mfg. Corp., 206 F.2d at 781 (the "work [of attorneys 
employed by creditors] must be at the expense of their clients 
unless it is in some manner beneficial to the estate"); In re 
Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988); Consol. Bancshares, 
Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253 ("a creditor's attorney must ordinarily 
look to its own client for payment, unless the creditor's 
attorney rendered services on behalf of the reorganization, not 
merely on behalf of his client's interest, and conferred a 
significant and demonstrable benefit to the debtor's estate and 
the creditors.") (quoting from In re Gen. Oil Distribs., 51 B.R. 
794, 806 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)); In re Bldgs. Dev. Co., 98 F.2d 
844 (7th Cir. 1938);  In re Jensen-Farley Pictures Inc., 47 B.R. 
557, 569 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).  Most activities of an interested 
party that contribute to the estate will also, of course, benefit 
that party to some degree, and the existence of a self-interest 
cannot  in and of itself preclude reimbursement.  Nevertheless, 
the purpose of § 503(b)(3)(D) is to encourage activities that 
will benefit the estate as a whole, and in line with the twin 
objectives of § 503(b)(3)(D), "substantial contribution" should 
be applied in a manner that excludes reimbursement in connection 
with activities of creditors and other interested parties which 
are designed primarily to serve their own interests and which, 
accordingly, would have been undertaken absent an expectation of 
reimbursement from the estate.   
 We turn now to the statutory requirement that the 
expenses be ones incurred "in a case under chapter 9 or 11."  The 
Lebrons argue that this language expressly limits the authority 
conferred by § 503(b)(3)(D) to only those expenses that were 
incurred during the pendency of a chapter 9 or chapter 11 case. 
In other words, they claim that this section authorizes only the 
recovery of expenses that are the result of efforts occurring 
after a petition for chapter 9 or 11 proceedings is filed, but 
before either the reorganization ends, or the case is converted 
to one under chapter 7 or 13. 
 We perceive a fallacy in this argument.  It is the 
"substantial contribution," not the activity, that must occur "in 
a case" under chapter 11, and the Lebrons' argument assumes that 
activities conducted and expenses incurred before the filing of a 
chapter 11 petition cannot substantially contribute to the 
reorganization efforts during the pendency of a chapter 11 case. 
We believe the facts of this case, as found by the bankruptcy 
court, demonstrate that this assumption is not sound.  The 
information generated by Scott's pre-petition activities in this 
case materially assisted the trustee in carrying out his 
responsibilities in the chapter 11 proceedings. 
 We think our understanding of § 503(b)(3)(D) is 
confirmed by its legislative history.  Under section 77B(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Act, reimbursement of fees was authorized for pre-
petition services of informal committees of creditors and 
stockholders where those services directly benefitted the 
reorganization.  See, e.g., In re Ulen & Co., 130 F.2d 303 (2d 
Cir. 1942); In re Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., 111 F.2d 235 (6th 
Cir. 1940); Stark v. Woods Bros. Corp., 109 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 
1940); Sullivan & Cromwell v. Colo. Fuel & Iron Co., 96 F.2d 219 
(10th Cir. 1938); In re Memphis Street Ry. Co., 86 F.2d 891 (6th 
Cir. 1936); In re Tudor Gables Bldg. Corp., 83 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 
1936); In re Nat'l Lock Co., 82 F.2d 600 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 299 U.S. 562 (1936).2  The practice of organizing 
informal committees before the filing of the petition to function 
in anticipation of reorganization proceedings continues today.3  
 The legislative history of § 503(b)(3)(D) indicates 
that it was intended to alter the preexisting law in only one 
respect:  "It does not require a contribution that leads to 
confirmation of a plan [because Congress believed that in] many 
cases it will be a substantial contribution if the person 
involved uncovers facts that would lead to a denial of 
confirmation, such as fraud in connection with the case."  Supra, 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5852-53.  This legislative history and the 
practice under the prior law demonstrate, we believe, that 
                                                           
2Under this "direct benefit" rule, pre-petition expenses were 
reimbursed only if they directly contributed to a reorganization 
plan that ultimately was adopted. 
3See Bankr. Rule 2007, 11 U.S.C.A. (1984 & Supp. 1994), which 
states that, "on application of a party in interest and after 
notice as the court may direct, the court may appoint as the 
committee of unsecured creditors required by § 1102(a) of the 
Code, members of a committee selected before the order for relief 
in accordance with subdivision (b) of this rule."  Thus, if 
certain requirements are met, the court may appoint some or all 
of the members of the informal committee to the formal post-
petition committee. 
§503(b)(3)(D) was not intended to impose an across-the-board bar 
to the reimbursement of expenses incurred before the filing of 
the petition.   
 The only other Court of Appeals to have addressed the 
issue agrees with our reading of § 503(b)(3)(D).  In re Lister, 
846 F.2d at 57 ("administrative expenses incurred prior to the 
filing of a [chapter 11] bankruptcy petition are compensable 
under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D), if those expenses are incurred in 
efforts which were intended to benefit, and which did directly 
benefit, the bankruptcy estate."). 
 While we conclude that there is no across-the-board bar 
to the recovery of Scott's pre-petition expenses, we reach a 
different conclusion with respect to his post-conversion 
expenses.  Where, as here, a chapter 11 proceeding is converted 
into a chapter 7 proceeding, we do not see how expenses incurred 
after the conversion can be said to have made a substantial 
contribution in the proceedings under chapter 11.  There are 
provisions of § 503 other than subsection (b)(3)(D) that 
authorize reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with a 
chapter 7 proceeding, and we believe that post-conversion 
expenses were intended to be reimbursable under those provisions 
or not at all.  See, e.g., §§ 503(b)(3)(B) and (C). 
 In sum, we conclude that, if the substantial 
contribution test is met, expenses incurred by a creditor prior 
to the filing of a chapter 11 petition, or while a chapter 11 
case is pending, are recoverable pursuant to § 503(b)(3)(D). 
Expenses incurred after a chapter 11 case is converted to one 




 Applying the above analysis to the case at hand, we 
hold that the district court erred when it found that pre-
petition expenses are not covered by § 503(b)(3)(D).  We also 
conclude that there is record support for the bankruptcy court's 
factual finding that Scott's efforts, both before the chapter 11 
petition was filed and during the time the case was in chapter 
11, benefitted the estate during the pendency of the chapter 11 
proceeding.  As the bankruptcy court explained, Scott's efforts 
against Copple and Mechem were "critical to the Court in making 
an immediate determination to appoint a Trustee and critical to 
the Trustee in making a prompt investigation and report to the 
Court."   
 As we have indicated, however, a determination that a 
benefit was conferred does not end the inquiry as to whether 
there was a "substantial contribution" within the meaning of 
§503(b)(3)(D).  A creditor should be presumed to be acting in his 
or her own interest unless the court is able to find that his or 
her actions were designed to benefit others who would foreseeably 
be interested in the estate.  In the absence of such a finding, 
there can be no award of expenses even though there may have been 
an incidental benefit to the chapter 11 estate.  Here, the 
bankruptcy court made no such finding.  There was evidence before 
it tending to show that Scott incurred the reimbursed expense in 
pursuit of his own interests.  He appears to have incurred a 
substantial portion of that expense, for example, in litigation 
over control of Mechem initiated many months before a 
reorganization was anticipated by anyone.  If this be true, this 
expense would not be reimbursable under § 503(b)(3)(D) even if 
information disclosed in that litigation subsequently turned out 
to be helpful to the trustee.  On the other hand, there was 
evidence from which the bankruptcy court could have concluded 
that at least some of Scott's efforts were designed to benefit 
the chapter 11 estate and its creditors. 
 The inquiry concerning the existence of a substantial 
contribution is one of fact, and it is the bankruptcy court that 
is in the best position to perform the necessary fact finding 
task.  Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253.  Accordingly, 
we will remand this case with instructions that the bankruptcy 
court determine whether the efforts which Scott made prior to the 
conversion of the chapter 11 proceeding made a substantial 
contribution within the meaning of § 503(b)(3)(D). 
 The bankruptcy court also awarded Scott expenses that 
he incurred after the case was converted to chapter 7. 
Specifically, the court awarded Scott expenses associated with 
his assistance to the trustee in the collection of assets for the 
benefit of the creditors, and his role in setting up replacement 
trusts for the investors.  We have found, however, that  
§§ 503(b)(3)(D) and (b)(4) do not authorize fee awards for 
expenses incurred after a case is converted from one under 
chapter 11 to one under chapter 7.  Therefore, with regard to the 
administrative expenses that Scott incurred after the conversion 
of the case to chapter 7, we will affirm the district court's 
decision to reverse the bankruptcy court's award.4     
V. 
 We will reverse the order of the district court and 
direct that the case be remanded to the bankruptcy court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.5   
                                                    
                                                           
4The Lebrons argue, and the district court agreed, that it was an 
abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court to award Scott any 
administrative expenses because Scott was an incorporator and 
insider in the company that committed the fraud, and, therefore, 
it would be inequitable to prioritize his claims over the claims 
of the other, less involved, creditors.  We reject this argument, 
however, because there is no evidence that Scott was at all 
involved in the fraud.   
5Scott also asks us to uphold the bankruptcy court's award to him 
on an alternative theory.  The theory rests upon a passing 
comment of the bankruptcy court:  "Certainly, if Scott were 
entitled only to post-petition fees and expenses, he would be 
entitled to a fee enhancement on the basis of the post-petition 
fees in an amount equivalent to his pre-petition fees."  B.Op. 
10.  We decline to reinstate the award to Scott on this theory 
for several reasons.  First, Scott would not be entitled to an 
enhancement in connection with post-petition fees which he 
incurred in pursuit of his own interest with only an incidental 
benefit being bestowed on the estate.  Second, even assuming an 
enhancement is appropriate in some circumstances under  
§§ 503(b)(3)(D) and (b)(4), we perceive no rational basis for an 
enhancement of post-petition fees measured by the amount of pre-
petition fees incurred.  Without the benefit of some further 
explanation of the bankruptcy court's thinking, this passing 
observation appears far too arbitrary to be sustainable. Finally, 
we understand the purpose of subsection (b)(4) to be to limit 
reimbursement of a creditor for legal and accounting expenses to 
an amount determined by the court to be reasonable after 
considering the factors designated therein.  We do not read 
subsection (b)(4) to authorize a payment to a creditor in excess 
of the amount he or she was required to pay for those services.   
